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1. Introduction 
 
One challenge to states in designing their income tax systems is how to treat non-
resident earners.  If more than one state taxes its residents on their income and taxes 
non-resident earners on their income earned within the state, non-resident earners will 
often be subject to double taxation on their income:  once in their home state, and once 
in their state of employment. One way states have circumvented this double taxation 
issue is to enter into a reciprocity agreement with another state.  Such agreements allow 
income to be taxed in the state of residence even though it is earned in another state.  
These agreements are most prevalent between states that experience a great deal of 
cross-border commuting. 
By entering into a reciprocity agreement, a state can no longer think of non-
resident workers as part of their personal income tax base. Indeed, the tax base simply 
becomes the set of residents within the state. As a result, states may have less incentive 
to engage in income tax competition with neighboring states, as non-resident workers 
no longer contribute to the tax base. Because these non-resident workers do cross 
borders, however, they represent a mobile component for other tax bases, such as those 
employing sales taxes and excise taxes. 
Having compiled the starting (and in some cases, ending) dates of all state income 
tax reciprocity agreements, we will demonstrate that not only do such agreements 
dampen competition over the state’s income tax rate, but the states that adopt reciprocity 
agreements also exhibit decreased levels of competition over another (highly mobile) 
tax base – cigarette taxation. We interpret our findings as indicating that reciprocity 
agreements serve as a credible way for states to act cooperatively with one another, 
thereby preventing states from engaging in a full-blown race to the bottom. 
In the following sections of the paper we present a brief history of state income tax 
reciprocity agreements, review the tax competition literature and discuss the potential 
effects of reciprocity agreements, present our empirical results, and offer concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. The Why and How of Reciprocity Agreements 
 
The notion that states can tax all their residents on all their income regardless of where 
it is earned, and can tax the income of all nonresidents earned within its borders, has 
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 been in place for many years. One consequence of such a system is that if all states 
adhere to this belief, numerous individuals would be subject to double taxation of their 
income:  once by their state of residence, and once by their state of employment. Thus, 
states have devised various measures to prevent double taxation from occurring. 
The first approach involved a system of resident and nonresident credits. A 
resident credit allows residents to credit taxes paid to other states, most often without 
regard to if the state of employment reciprocates. Some states allow a credit to non-
residents for their liability in their own state; most states require the other state be 
willing to reciprocate. While such a system helps minimize double taxation, it often 
fails to eliminate it in its entirety because some states have different definitions of 
resident/non-resident status. 
Such a system worked very well when industry was concentrated in a few states.  
As more states created an industrial base, the need for interstate commuting fell, causing 
fewer states to feel compelled to tackle the double taxation issue for non-residents.  As 
an example, in 1961, Wisconsin passed legislation exempting nonresidents from 
Wisconsin tax if other states did likewise. It just so happened that Minnesota repealed 
its nonresident credit in 1961 in response to a previous repeal by North Dakota. As a 
result, Minnesotans could not take advantage of the Wisconsin law, and both states 
collected income from each other’s residents and allowed a credit to each of their 
residents.1 
The advent of withholding state income taxes further complicated this issue.  
Oregon became the first state to implement withholding in 1948, and by 1967 only three 
states who imposed taxes on personal income failed to have such a system.2  Since 
withholding income tax is the responsibility of the employer, it became very easy for 
states to collect revenue from non-resident workers. Over time, this led to the further 
elimination of the non-resident credit by many states.3 
By 1965, the burden on interstate commuters had thereby increased, as they 
were required to file income tax returns with two states, with the resident state often 
                                                 
1 A similar scenario happened after New Jersey imposed a commuter tax in 1961 in order to tax 
commuters between the two states.  New York repealed its nonresident credit as retaliation, and as a 
result, Delaware could no longer give a credit to its residents working in New York because its credit 
required reciprocation by other states.  See the ACIR for more details on both NY-NJ-DE and MN-WI-
ND. 
2 According to the ACIR, Mississippi, North Dakota and California did not have general withholding in 
1967, although California did impose withholding on non-residents. 
3 As reported by the ACIR, most states that dropped their non-resident credit did so while installing a 
withholding system at the same time. 
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 offering a credit for taxes paid by the resident to the state of employment. States had 
wildly differing definitions of residence status, and some were beginning to revoke their 
credits as a retaliatory measure against other states. As a result, in October of 1965, the 
ACIR (Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations) produced two 
recommendations: 
 
(1) “all States continue to allow credits to their residents for personal income 
taxes they pay  to other States and that those States that now allow a 
nonresident credit repeal such nonresident provision.” 
(2) “the State tax agency be authorized to enter into reciprocal agreements to 
eliminate potential double taxation that might result from conflict in 
interpretation of the residence rule.” 
  
 --from Federal-State Coordination of Personal Income Taxes, October 1965, 
p.24 and 29 
 
The ACIR’s call was heard, and the rise of the income tax reciprocity agreement began. 
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 The first income tax reciprocity agreement that came in to existence was between 
Virginia and Kentucky in September of 1964.  Figure 1 shows when states entered their 
first reciprocity agreement, with Maryland being the last state to enter into its first 
agreement in 1988.  Note that the states having reciprocity agreements are clustered in 
the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic. Moreover, there are three distinct waves when states 
first enter an agreement.  The first was the mid to late 1960’s, when in conjunction with 
the release of the ACIR report, eight states began an agreement. The second wave 
occurred in the early 1970’s, when four states started agreements. The three remaining 
states began agreements in the late 1970’s or 1980’s. By 1992, 30 bilateral reciprocity 
agreements involving 15 states were in place, the last being between Maryland and 
Virginia. 12 states have more than one agreement, with Kentucky leading the way with 
seven. Iowa, Montana and New Jersey are the only states to have one reciprocity 
agreement (with Illinois, North Dakota and Pennsylvania, respectively). Table 1 lists the 
starting date of each income tax reciprocity agreement. 
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 Table 1 -- Year of Adoption of Income Tax Reciprocity Agreements, by State
Illinois (4 agreements) Michigan (6 agreements)
Kentucky 1971 Wisconsin 1967
Michigan 1971 Kentucky 1968
Iowa 1972 Indiana 1968
Wisconsin 1973 Illinois 1971
Indiana 1977-1998 Ohio 1972
Minnesota 1984
Indiana (5 agreements)
Michigan 1968 New Jersey (1 agreement)
Kentucky 1977 Pennsylvania 1978
Ohio 1977
Pennsylvania 1977 North Dakota (2 agreements)
Wisconsin 1977 Minnesota 1969
Illinois 1977-1998 Montana 1982
Iowa (1 agreement) Ohio (5 agreements)
Illinois 1972 Kentucky 1972
Michigan 1972
Kentucky (7 agreements) West Virginia 1972
Virginia 1964 Indiana 1977
Michigan 1968 Pennsylvania 1978
West Virginia 1968
Wisconsin 1968 Pennsylvania (5 agreements)
Illinois 1971 West Virginia 1972
Ohio 1972 Indiana 1977
Indiana 1977 Ohio 1978
Virginia 1982
Maryland (3 agreements) Maryland 1990
West Virginia 1988
Pennsylvania 1990 Virginia (4 agreements)
Virginia 1992 Kentucky 1964
Pennsylvania 1982
Montana (1 agreement) West Virginia 1988
North Dakota 1982 Maryland 1988
Minnesota (3 agreements) West Virginia (5 agreements)
Wisconsin 1968 Kentucky 1965
North Dakota 1969 Pennsylvania 1972
Michigan 1984 Ohio 1972
Virginia 1988
Maryland 1988
Wisconsin (5 agreements)
Kentucky 1967
Michigan 1967
Minnesota 1968
Illinois 1973
Indiana 1977  
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 An income tax reciprocity agreement results in income being taxed as though it were 
earned in the state of residence, as opposed to the state of employment. By entering a 
reciprocity agreement, states agree not to withhold tax for their state from the employee.  
Employees simply fill out a form with their employer4 declaring they are exempt from 
employer state taxation. States are not bound to withhold taxes for the state of residence, 
although most do. 
In some cases, the reciprocity agreement results in an aggregate revenue loss to a 
state, which often becomes a flashpoint in maintaining the agreement. According to the 
Wisconsin Joint Committee on Finance (2001), Illinois estimated that the net loss in 
1997 from its reciprocity agreement with Wisconsin at $11 million5.  Illinois threatened 
to end the agreement6, resulting in the passage of Wisconsin Act 63 in which Wisconsin 
made payments to Illinois to compensate for part of the shortfall. Wisconsin has a 
similar provision with Minnesota, although in 2002, then Gov. Jesse Ventura announced 
plans to eliminate the reciprocity agreement to help balance the budget, as fiscal 
analysts with the Minnesota House of Representatives estimated the a loss of $2.2 
million, despite payments of nearly $58 million from Wisconsin. The Minnesota 
Legislature ultimately preserved the reciprocity agreement, which is still in place today. 
 
3. The Tax Competition Literature 
 
A key component in models of tax competition is capital mobility7. In these models, 
capital will flow between jurisdictions as it searches for the highest after tax rate of 
return. By lowering its tax on capital, a state can encourage capital to flow into its state.  
If the resulting inflow is large enough, the jurisdiction would be able to increase overall 
revenue despite the lower tax rate. 
The problem for the state, however, is that other states are free to respond in 
kind by lowering their tax rates as well. If capital is perfectly mobile, meaning it can 
cross borders without cost, states will enter into a race to the bottom scenario where, in 
equilibrium, both states ultimately have zero tax rates. Since most capital does incur 
relocation costs, however, small changes in tax rates may not result in large capital 
                                                 
4 For example, North Dakota residents would file form NR-2 in Montana. 
5 Wisconsin, by contrast, estimated the loss at $9 million. 
6 Interestingly, the agreement between Illinois and Indiana was terminated in January 1998, presumably 
for the same reason. 
7 The condensed summary we provide shortchanges the richness in tax competition models.  See Wilson 
(1999) for a thorough survey of the theoretical work on tax competition. 
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 flows, since the tax savings cannot compensate for the relocation costs. The mobility of 
capital still puts downward pressure on tax rates, but how low taxes will go depends on 
the degree of this mobility. 
The search for empirical examples of tax competition has been long and varied.  
The literature has focused on property taxation (e.g., Ladd 1992, Heydels and Vuchelen, 
1998; Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Revelli, 2001; Bordignon et al, 2003; Sole-Olle, 
2003; Allers and Elhorst, 2006), in part because the level of government, is small.  
Since the distance needed to traverse borders between these jurisdictions is relatively 
small, Tiebout-type migration in response to changing taxes becomes likely. Not 
surprisingly, most studies have found evidence of competition over the property tax, 
with neighboring jurisdictions reacting positively to each other’s choice of rate. And 
while specific estimates of the degree of competition have varied by study, a 
neighboring jurisdiction increasing property tax rates by ten percent typically results in 
an own-source property tax rate increase of approximately 4 percent. The empirical 
support for tax competition appears to be quite robust across specifications employing 
different time periods, jurisdictions, control variables, and even countries. 
While the majority of research has been on property taxes, other taxes have also 
been explored in the literature. Taxes on personal income (Case, 1993; Besley and Case, 
1995; Rork, 2003; Hill, 2007), corporate income (Brett and Pinkse, 2000; Buettner, 
2001; Rork, 2003), general sales and excise taxes (Rork, 2003; Luna, 2004; Egger et al, 
2005) and even estate and inheritance taxation (Conway and Rork, 2004) have all been 
shown to exhibit evidence of interjurisdictional competition at relatively the same 
strength as property taxes. The consistency in these results has led the literature to begin 
moving away from exploring explicit tax rates. More recent studies of interjurisdictional 
competition have discovered evidence of competition in such varied areas as tax 
progressivity (Chernick, 2005), composition of sales tax bases (Fletcher and Murray, 
2006), and implicit taxes such as lottery taxes (Brown and Rork, 2005). 
Our purpose in this paper is to explore the impact reciprocity has on tax 
competition between states. Entering into a reciprocity agreement essentially limits the 
mobility of the state’s income tax base, as out of state workers no longer form part of 
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 the base. This means that the incentive to engage in competition over the income tax is 
lessened, since out of state workers have no reason to respond.8 
While the potential tax base for income taxes becomes more inelastic as a result 
of the reciprocity agreement, states have other dimensions to compete over. And some 
of these taxes, such as tobacco and motor fuels, have exhibited a high degree of 
elasticity and are potentially ripe for competition (Rork, 2003). The question becomes 
do states become more aggressive over courting these sources of capital, since the 
income tax reciprocity agreement has essentially tied their hands in one dimension?  Or, 
do these reciprocity agreements foster an overall atmosphere of cooperation between 
states? The answer is an empirical one, which we set forth to discover in the next 
section. 
 
4.  Empirical Specification 
 
Modeling tax competition  
We extend the basic empirical tax competition models utilized by Rork (2003) to 
explore the impact of reciprocity agreements on state-level tax competition. Our model 
is applied to the 48 contiguous states over the period from 1967 to 2003, resulting in 
1776 observations.9 Although other studies could also serve as a suitable starting point 
for our model, we follow Rork’s empirical specification for several reasons. First, Rork 
investigates interjurisdictional competition for a variety of taxes and finds evidence of 
direct competition over mobile tax bases such as cigarette, gasoline, and corporate 
income, and indirect competition over immobile bases such as sales and individual 
income. Using such a model allows us to investigate the potential effects of an income 
tax reciprocity agreement on tax bases with differing mobility. Additionally, Rork uses 
a sizable number of fiscal, political, and demographic regressors to control for other 
factors that may be correlated with a state’s tax rate decisions. 
 
                                                 
8 One could argue that lowering the income tax could result in non-resident workers changing their state 
of residence.  In fact, Coomes and Hoyt (2008) show that when choosing where to locate in a multi-state 
MSA, most people will pick the lower tax side.  Most of their sample, however, involves people moving 
into the geographic region from far away.  In our case, people have already chosen where to locate within 
the geographic area, and it seems unlikely that small changes in the income tax will cause people to 
revisit that decision. 
9 We follow Rork (2003) and begin our sample period in 1967 since, prior to that year, various tax data 
(such as corporate income and personal income tax revenues) were aggregated together in some states. 
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 The now-standard spatial lag specification that we estimate is given by: 
 
,,...,1 ;,...,1: TtNiyy ittiititit ==++++= εθδβρ XW  [1] 
 
where yit  is a (TN×1) vector of the tax rate of interest in state i at time t, Xit  is a 
(TN×K) matrix of regressors in state i at time t assumed to be correlated with the state's 
tax rate of interest, εit  is the error term, and Wyit  is the spatial lag term. The model 
includes both state-specific fixed effects ( iδ ) and time-specific fixed effects ( tθ ) to 
control for unobserved factors that may be related to a state's tax rates. W is a weighting 
matrix that assigns weights to each jurisdiction, thereby determining which jurisdictions 
are neighbors to one another. Any weighting matrix W is an exogenous (TN×TN) block 
diagonal matrix composed of a single cross-sectional (N×N) weights matrix w along T 
block diagonal elements. In other words, given an identity matrix of dimension T, 
denoted I, each (TN×TN) weighting matrix is simply W = w ⊗ I.10  Finally, the scalar ρ 
is the spatial lag coefficient that must be estimated. Evidence of positive 
interjurisdictional competition exists if ρ > 0, negative interjurisdictional competition if 
ρ < 0, and no interjurisdictional competition ifρ  = 0.      
Since reciprocity agreements directly eliminate non-residents from a state's 
personal income tax base and may influence competition over other tax bases, we apply 
the model to personal income tax rates and cigarette tax rates. Cigarette tax rates 
provide a useful contrast to income tax rates because every state taxes cigarettes, the tax 
base is highly mobile and uniform across states, and there is considerable evidence that 
states engage in strong interjurisdictional competition over this base. 
To maintain consistency with the tax competition literature and to assess the 
robustness of our results, we estimate equation [1] using both a standard contiguity 
weighting matrix and a population-contiguity weighting matrix. The contiguity 
weighting matrix sets the individual elements of w (denoted ωij) equal to unity if states i 
and j (i≠j) share a common border, and to zero otherwise. When the population-
contiguity weights are employed, then the individual elements of w are set equal the 
population of state i's common-border neighbor.11 Each weighting matrix is also row-
                                                 
10 If the model is applied to a cross-section of data, then I = 1 and W reduces to w.  
11 The population-contiguity weighting matrix is formed using each state’s mean population over the 
sample period (1967 – 2003).   
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 standardized, which implies that states are assumed to react to the weighted average of 
their neighboring states' tax rates.  
The matrix (Xit) includes the set of fiscal, political, and demographic variables 
employed by Rork (2003) to account for other factors that may affect a state’s decision 
to alter its tax rate. These variables include the state’s per capita outstanding debt, per 
capita federal transfers, indicator variables that equal unity if year t was an election year 
and if the legislature and governor are of the same political party, unemployment rate, 
and the percentage of the state’s population over age 65. Complete variable 
descriptions, data sources, and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2. 
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 Table 2 – Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics, 1967 – 2003 
 
 
VARIABLE 
 
MEAN 
(ST DEV) 
 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
SOURCE 
 
Percent 65 and older 11.671 
 (2.061) 
 
Percentage of the state’s population age 
65 and older (% * 100) 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
State per capita income 14.696 
 (9.040) 
 
Per capita personal income in thousands 
of current dollars 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
Election year dummy 0.269 
 (0.443) 
 
=1 if year t was an election year for the 
state, =0 otherwise 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
Same party Democrat 0.300 
 
(0.458) 
 
 
=1 if legislature and governor are 
controlled by Democrats in year t, =0 
otherwise 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
Same party Republican 0.162 
 
(0.368) 
 
 
=1 if legislature and governor are 
controlled by Republicans in year t, =0 
otherwise 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
Unemployment rate 5.724 
 (2.055) 
 
State’s unemployment rate (rate * 100) 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
Per capita fed transfers 0.492 
 (0.403) 
 
Per capita federal transfers in thousands 
of current dollars 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
Per capita debt 1.098 
 (1.259) 
 
State’s outstanding per capita debt in 
thousands of current dollars 
 
State Government Finances 
Reciprocity indicator 
 
 
0.273 
(0.445) 
 
=1 if the state has an active reciprocity 
agreement with any other state at time t 
 
Individual states 
Reciprocity agreements 
 
 
 
0.957 
(1.877) 
 
 
number of active income tax reciprocity 
agreements a state has at time t 
 
Individual states 
Income tax rate 
 
 
5.913 
(4.763) 
 
State's top (statutory) marginal income 
tax rate applied to personal income 
 
University of Michigan 
World Tax Database 
Cigarette tax rate 
 
 
21.519 
(19.416) 
 
State’s tax rate on cigarettes in cents per 
package 
 
State Government Finances 
 
Notes:  Our sample includes 48 states over the period from 1967 to 2003, resulting in 1776 observations.  Alaska and Hawaii are 
excluded.  
 
In terms of the reciprocity agreements, we collected the starting (and in the case of 
Indiana-Illinois, ending) dates for all state income tax reciprocity agreements in the US 
since the first agreement was adopted in 1964. When the start date was not easily 
attained in state tax codes or on state tax department websites, we contacted officials in 
a state’s department of revenue for the date. In the odd case where we received different 
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 dates from different states, we went with the earliest date as we discovered that the latter 
date was often a renewal date. 
We incorporate the information regarding reciprocity agreements into our 
empirical model using both indicator variables and interaction terms. The variable 
Reciprocity Indicator equals unity if a state has an active agreement with any other state 
at time t, while the variable Reciprocity Agreements equals the number of active 
agreements for the state at time t. Since it is plausible that both the existence and 
number of active reciprocity agreements may affect a state's decision to alter its tax 
rates independent of the existence or magnitude of any tax competition, the use of 
indicator variables will permit us to capture any such effects. 
On the other hand, reciprocity agreements clearly have the potential to alter the 
nature of state tax competition by directly altering the relevant tax base. We explore the 
possibility that reciprocity agreements alter the nature of state tax competition by 
interacting both of our reciprocity variables with the spatial lag term from equation [1].  
These specifications allow us to assess, at the margin, whether or not a state reacts in a 
different manner to the tax rate changes of neighboring states when a reciprocity 
agreement is in place. 
    
Econometric Issues 
In addition to the 'usual' endogeneity caused by the spatial lag term, incorporating a 
state's decision to enter into a reciprocity agreement with other states in equation [1] 
introduces an added endogeneity concern. It is certainly reasonable to believe, and 
perhaps to even expect, that a state's decision to enter (or not enter) into a reciprocity 
agreement with neighboring states is related to the state's preference for taxes and, 
therefore, tax rates. Hence, to obtain accurate estimates of how state tax rates react 
following the adoption of reciprocity agreements requires us to take into account that a 
state's tax rates could influence the decision to enact a reciprocity agreement, which, in 
turn, may affect the state's decision to alter its tax rates. 
Although spatial lag models are most widely estimated using maximum 
likelihood methods, such an approach cannot be extended to allow for multiple 
endogenous regressors. Consequently, we select instruments for both the spatial lag 
term and reciprocity indicator variables and estimate our model using two-stage least 
squares (2SLS).   
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 In terms of selecting instruments, we follow Kelejian and Robinson's (1993) 
finding that consistent parameter estimates can be obtained from utilizing spatially 
lagged exogenous regressors as instruments for the spatial lag term.12  The challenge in 
finding valid instruments for the reciprocity indicators is that we must identify variables 
that are related to a state's decision to enact a reciprocity agreement (or agreements), yet 
are unrelated to a state's fiscal preferences. We use four variables that are based on 
interstate compact agreements to serve as instruments for both the Reciprocity Indicator 
variable and Reciprocity Agreements variable. Interstate compacts are binding legal 
contracts that two or more states may enter into regarding virtually any topic or issue.  
Moreover, member states may not unilaterally abandon an enacted interstate compact 
unless doing so is stipulated in the compact. As a recent study by The Council of State 
Governments notes, few interstate compacts were enacted before 1920 and most of 
these compacts dealt exclusively with border disputes. However, the use of such 
agreements has expanded considerably in recent decades as states have voluntarily 
entered into more than 150 different interstate compacts in the past 75 years, covering 
topics ranging from information sharing to emergency management.   
Although interstate compacts do exist regarding fiscal matters, including tax 
issues, we use of information from non-fiscal interstate compact agreements to serve as 
instruments for the existence (and number) of income tax reciprocity agreements for 
two reasons.13 First, states that are members of current interstate compacts (and 
members with more agreements) may have an underlying willingness to cooperate with 
neighboring states that is related to their willingness to enact one or more income tax 
reciprocity agreements with neighboring states. Second, given the variety of topics 
                                                 
12 The use of spatially lagged exogenous variables as instruments is derived from the reduced form of the 
spatial lag mode (see, for instance, Kelejian and Robinson 1993).  Specifically, the exogenous variables 
that we spatially lag to serve as instruments for the spatial lag term include: state per capita income, same 
party Democrat, same party Republican, election year dummy, each state's tax revenue as a share of total 
state revenue lagged 4 and 5 periods, each state's general fund surplus/deficit as a share of total state 
revenue lagged 4 and 5 periods, and each state's tax rate of interest (income or cigarette, depending on the 
model) lagged 4 and 5 periods.  Descriptions and documentation are provided in Appendix Table A1.  
13  Interstate compacts differ from income tax reciprocity agreements in several important ways.  First, 
compacts are, in a legal sense, contracts between states.  This implies that legislative and executive 
branches in member states must accept identical compact language and the contract becomes effective 
when the required number of states agree to the compact's terms.  Moreover, compacts have the effect of 
statutory law and states are therefore obligated to follow the compact even if doing so is inconsistent with 
other state laws.  Finally, states may be compelled by Congress or the courts to comply with interstate 
compacts.  In contrast, state Revenue Commissioners (or equivalent) are generally granted sole authority 
by state legislatures to enter into unilateral income tax reciprocity agreements with other states.  Hence, 
for example, Kentucky's reciprocity agreement with West Virginia may be vastly different from 
Kentucky's agreement with Indiana.        
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 covered by interstate compacts, there are numerous compacts that could be related to a 
state's willingness to cooperate with neighboring states and remain unconnected to the 
state's fiscal preferences.   
Specifically, our four instruments for the existence and number of reciprocity 
agreements are defined as follows. First, an indicator variable that equals unity if a state 
is part of any interstate compact (in year t) to provide forest fire protection to other 
member states. Next, an indicator variable that is equal to the number of years a state 
has been part of any interstate compact to provide forest fire protection (in year t).  
Third, an indicator variable that equals unity if a state is part of an adoption assistance 
compact (in year t) that provides for the protection of children in interstate adoption 
cases. Finally, an indicator variable that equals unity if a state is part of an adoption and 
medical assistance compact (in year t) that promises protections and medical assistance 
to special needs children involved in interstate adoptions. Complete  documentation and 
descriptive statistics of our instruments for the spatial lag term and reciprocity variables 
are provided, respectively, in Appendix Tables A1 and A2.   
An additional area of concern in estimating a spatial lag model is the presence of 
spatial autocorrelation in the error term.  As Anselin (1988) describes, such correlation 
can arise from measurement error or from the fact that unobserved factors affecting a 
state's tax rates may be related across different states. Applying Anselin and Kelejian's 
(1997) LM test for residual autocorrelation to our two-stage least squares residuals from 
equation [1] indicated the presence of statistically significant residual correlation in half 
of our specifications. To correct for this problem, we estimate our standard errors using 
the recently developed robust heteroskedastic and autocorrelation (HAC) technique for 
spatial models developed by Kelejian and Prucha (2007). Their spatial HAC estimator is 
a non-parametric approach to estimating the asymptotic covariance matrix using 
weighted averages of the cross-products of the two-stage least squares residuals that is 
robust to heteroskedasticity and residual spatial correlation of unknown form.   
If we define a matrix (Q) as being comprised of the exogenous regressors from 
equation [1] and the instruments for both the spatial lag and reciprocity variables, then, 
as Kelejian and Prucha (2007) demonstrate, the spatial HAC estimator requires us to 
obtain a consistent estimate of QΣQΨ ˆ'ˆ = , where Σˆ  is the covariance matrix of the 
2SLS residuals. For an individual (r,s)th element of Ψˆ , Kelejian and Prucha (2007) 
show that the HAC estimator is given by: 
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where εˆ  is the 2SLS residual vector, qi and qj are individual elements of the matrix Q, 
and K is a kernel function that determines which (i,j) pairs are included in the cross 
products based upon the distance between any two cross-sections (dij) and the 
bandwidth parameter d (or maximum distance threshold).  If dij ≥ d , then K(dij / d) = 0.  
Otherwise, the kernel function 'weights' the covariances and, as Kelejian and Prucha 
(2007) note, numerous kernel functions are satisfactory. We opt to use the 
Epanechnikov kernel, K(dij / d) = 1 - (dij / d)2, and a distance threshold of 1200.14 With 
an estimate of [2] in hand, the asymptotic HAC covariance matrix is obtained from: 
 
 1111 VVVQQQΨQQQVVV −−−− ′′′′′′= )~~()(ˆ)()~~(  HAC  [3] 
 
where V = [ Wy, X] and VQQQQVV 1 ′′′= −)(~ .  
 
5.  Empirical Results 
 
We estimate four variations of equation [1] for each tax rate that we explore to assess 
the possible effects of reciprocity agreements on tax competition. Table 3 presents the 
two-stage least square results for the state's highest (statutory) marginal income tax rate 
using both weighting matrices (contiguity and population-contiguity) and both income 
reciprocity variables (Indicator and Agreements), while Table 4 reports the same 
specifications for cigarette tax rates. As is also evident from the tables, we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity using the Sargan test in each of the eight 
regressions that appear in this section. We begin with income tax rates before turning 
our attention to cigarette taxes. 
 
 
                                                 
14  Distances were measured as the difference between each state's population centriods from the 2000 
Census.  A distance threshold of 1200 miles implies that, on average, each state's unobserved variation in 
tax rates is correlated with the unobserved variation in 30 other states (with nearer neighbors having a 
greater influence).  We also explored the use of the Bartlett and Parzen kernels and found no difference in 
the statistical significance of the estimated regression coefficients. 
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 Table 3 – The Effect of Reciprocity Agreements on State Income Tax Rate 
Competition  
(† denotes an endogenous variable) 
  
 Contiguity Weights Population-Contiguity Weights 
Constant 11.0014 *** 12.2627 *** 6.0242   7.9936 * 
 (2.5410)   (3.9326)   (3.9338)   (4.6515)   
Percentage 65 & older -0.2132 * -0.2715 * -0.0815   -0.2134   
 (0.1234)   (0.1387)   (0.0881)   (0.1310)   
Per capita income -0.1458 ** -0.1659 ** -0.0970   -0.1197   
 (0.0618)   (0.0738)   (0.1057)   (0.1301)   
Election dummy -0.0611   -0.0815   -0.0784   -0.0869   
 (0.0689)   (0.0628)   (0.0761)   (0.0639)   
Democrat dummy -0.3247 *** -0.3135 *** -0.2732 * -0.2711 *** 
 (0.0926)   (0.1059)   (0.1408)   (0.0753)   
Republican dummy 0.4142 *** 0.3995 *** 0.3803 *** 0.2842 *** 
 (0.1241)   (0.0267)   (0.1225)   (0.0860)   
Unemployment rate 0.2146 *** 0.1440 *** 0.2277 *** 0.1753 *** 
 (0.0164)   (0.0116)   (0.0187)   (0.0479)   
Per capita federal transfers 0.0842   -0.2784   -0.1058   -0.3732   
 (0.5212)   (0.5440)   (0.7059)   (0.5296)   
Per capita outstanding debt -0.0311   0.0095   -0.1252   -0.0622   
 (0.0368)   (0.0655)   (0.1156)   (0.1181)   
Reciprocity indicator (=1 if any agreement) † -6.6657 ***  -6.2822 *  
 (2.4272)    (3.2145)    
Reciprocity agreements (= # of agreements) †  -2.8192 ***   -2.0149   
  (0.7592)     (1.6336)   
Neighbors tax rate† -0.7368 *** -0.6152 *** -0.4586 * -0.3578 *** 
 (0.1488)   (0.1932)   (0.2435)   (0.0817)   
(Neighbors tax rate * Reciprocity indicator) † 1.1569 *  0.8873    
 (0.6071)    (0.7414)    
(Neighbors tax rate * Reciprocity agreements) †  0.5156 ***   0.3897 * 
  (0.0773)     (0.2195)   
Anselin-Kelejian LM test for error autocorrelation 2.165  1.575  2.217  0.879  
     P-value for Anselin-Kelejian LM test 0.015  0.575  0.0132  0.189  
Sargan test 11.704  7.895  6.984  3.280  
     P-value for Sargan test 0.3862  0.722  0.800  0.986  
 
Notes:  Estimation was by two-stage least squares with Kelejian and Prucha's (2007) spatial HAC standard errors 
reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent 
level.  Models were applied to 48 states (excludes Alaska and Hawaii) over the period 1967 – 2003 and include both 
state and year fixed effects that are not reported.  The significance of Anselin and Kelejian's (1997) LM test for error 
autocorrelation confirms the need to utilize Kelejian and Prucha's (2007) HAC technique. 
 
Focusing on the control variables in the income tax rate models, we find, for instance, 
that when competitors are defined on the basis of contiguity, higher income states and 
states with larger elderly populations tend to have significantly lower top marginal rates.  
This may be due to the fact these segments of the population are relatively mobile.  In 
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 addition, regardless of how potential competitors are defined, we find that states with 
higher unemployment rates also have higher top marginal income tax rates.  In fact, a 
one percentage point increase in a state's unemployment rate is correlated with nearly a 
.14 to .22 percentage point increase in the top marginal rate, ceteris paribus. Finally, our 
results show the unified Democratic control corresponds to significantly lower top rates, 
while unified Republican control leads to significantly higher top rates.  
In terms of tax competition, our results are consistent with Rork (2003) and 
demonstrate that states compete indirectly over the personal income tax base.  
Considering all of the specifications in Table 3, our results indicate that a 10 percent 
increase in a neighboring states' top marginal income tax rate induces a reduction in the 
home state's top rate between 3.5 and 7.3 percent. Rork (2003) contends that the general 
lack of mobility among income earners may produce an inelastic tax base and therefore 
be responsible for the indirect competition. 
In terms of our reciprocity variables, our results yield some interesting insights.  
First of all, we find that top marginal income tax rates are significantly lower in states 
that have at least one active reciprocity agreement in place. Specifically, top marginal 
rates are between 6.2 and 6.6 percentage points lower in states with at least one active 
agreement relative to states with no reciprocity agreements. Moreover, the interaction 
between the reciprocity variables and the tax rates in neighboring states suggests that, at 
the margin, the competition between states is significantly reversed after a reciprocity 
agreement is in place. That is, while (on average) states compete indirectly over the 
personal income tax when no reciprocity agreement exists, their competition is 
significantly dampened once an agreement is enacted. Even considering that the 
decision to enact a reciprocity agreement may be endogenous, our results seem to 
suggest that states are strategically altering their post-reciprocity behavior such that they 
are avoiding a race to the bottom. 
Since reciprocity agreements appear to eliminate tax competition along the 
income tax dimension, an agreement could induce a state to compete more aggressively 
over other (more mobile) tax bases or it may bring about a more cooperative 
environment in setting tax rates and therefore could lessen the degree of competition.  
Table 4 below demonstrates how reciprocity agreements have influences state cigarette 
tax competition, which is known to be a highly mobile (and competitive tax base).   
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 Table 4 – The Effect of Reciprocity Agreements on State Cigarette Tax Rate 
Competition 
(† denotes an endogenous variable) 
  
 Contiguity Weights Population-Contiguity Weights 
Constant 24.0871 *** 46.2532 ** 16.7176   14.0769   
 (6.7538)   (21.7648)   (11.0114)   (19.8699)   
Percentage 65 & older -2.5632 *** -2.7471 *** -1.9490 *** -1.0181   
 (0.5694)   (0.5346)   (0.5332)   (0.8010)   
Per capita income 1.2816 *** 1.0885 *** 1.5342 *** 1.5237 *** 
 (0.2649)   (0.2413)   (0.1775)   (0.1001)   
Election dummy -0.5514 ** -0.5256 ** -0.4971 ** -0.5374 * 
 (0.2300)   (0.2471)   (0.2130)   (0.3259)   
Democrat dummy 0.4795 *** 0.2653   0.9538 *** 0.9633   
 (0.1623)   (0.3734)   (0.2823)   (0.5982)   
Republican dummy 0.0794   0.2461   -0.2823   -0.3917   
 (0.4596)   (0.4166)   (0.4332)   (0.4746)   
Unemployment rate 0.2237   -0.6034 * 0.0793   -0.1392   
 (0.1909)   (0.3236)   (0.1720)   (0.3115)   
Per capita federal transfers -2.9745   -5.0243   -2.4892   -4.1591   
 (4.0959)   (4.3575)   (3.7740)   (4.4803)   
Per capita outstanding debt -0.3885 * -0.1174   -0.4193   -0.5063   
 (0.2188)   (0.2609)   (0.3052)   (0.5511)   
Reciprocity indicator (=1 if any agreement) † 16.3641    32.1357 **  
 (16.5350)    (15.2162)    
Reciprocity agreements (= # of agreements) †  10.2799 **   4.7794   
  (4.0081)     (3.1591)   
Neighbors tax rate† 0.8406 *** 0.8606 *** 0.7005 *** 0.6891 *** 
 (0.0370)   (0.0998)   (0.0585)   (0.0431)   
(Neighbors tax rate * Reciprocity indicator) † -0.1001    -0.6029 ***  
 (0.2894)    (0.1863)    
(Neighbors tax rate * Reciprocity agreements) †  -0.2192 ***   -0.2055 *** 
  (0.0795)     (0.0179)   
Anselin-Kelejian LM test for error autocorrelation 5.366  1.204  0.020  0.357  
     P-value for Anselin-Kelejian LM test 0.000  0.114  0.491  0.360  
Sargan test 9.117  11.237  7.265  14.306  
     P-value for Sargan test 0.611  0.425  0.777  0.216  
 
Notes:  Estimation was by two-stage least squares with Kelejian and Prucha's (2007) spatial HAC standard errors 
reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent 
level.  Models were applied to 48 states (excludes Alaska and Hawaii) over the period 1967 – 2003 and include both 
state and year fixed effects that are not reported. The significance of Anselin and Kelejian's (1997) LM test for error 
autocorrelation confirms the need to utilize Kelejian and Prucha's (2007) HAC technique. 
 
Consistent with Rork (2003), our results in Tables 3 confirm the high degree of 
direction competition that occurs over state cigarette tax rates. Across all specifications, 
we find that a 10 cents per pack tax increase on cigarettes by nearby states induces a 6.8 
to 8.6 cent increase at home. These results demonstrate the risk that policymakers bear 
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 when relying on excise taxes because the tax bases appear to be highly vulnerable to 
erosion from neighboring states. 
Concentrating on the reciprocity variables, we find some weak evidence that 
cigarette tax rates are higher (between 10 and 30 cents per pack) with reciprocity 
agreements in place. In contrast, however, we find solid evidence that competition over 
the cigarette tax base has also diminished since the adoption of a reciprocity agreement.  
Our results show that, depending on the model, home states react to a 10 cent tax 
increase by the neighbors on the order of 4.8 to 6.6 cents per pack post-reciprocity 
agreement, compared to 6.8 to 8.6 cents pre-reciprocity agreements. Thus, while 
enacting an income tax reciprocity agreement does not appear to eliminate tax 
competition over highly mobile and competitive bases, our results suggest that active 
agreements may foster a more cooperative environment and help states avoid a race to 
the bottom. 
Finally, we ran two very simple robustness checks on our results. First, instead 
of utilizing Kelejian and Prucha’s (2007) HAC spatial errors, we re-calculated our 
standard errors in Tables 3 and 4 using White heteroskedastic-consistent errors and 
found our results were consistent, so that the use of the HAC estimator was not driving 
any of our results. Second, we re-estimated our models by limited information 
maximum likelihood (LIML), since LIML has been found to outperform conventional 
instrumental variables estimators in the presence of weak estimates. Once again, the 
conclusion of our models remained unchanged. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The evolution of the state income tax reciprocity agreement provides us with a unique 
opportunity to look at the dynamics of state competition. We show that states entering a 
reciprocity agreement are less likely to engage in income tax competition with their 
neighbors. More importantly, however, we also show that these states are also less 
likely to engage in competition in other tax dimensions, such as tobacco, which 
traditionally has a very mobile base.   
Although states have not entered any new reciprocity agreements since 1988, 
our results are particularly relevant for two reasons. First, California and Hawaii, as well 
as Kansas and Missouri, have recently explored entering a bilateral reciprocity 
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 agreement with one another. Combined with the recent spat between Minnesota and 
Wisconsin over maintaining their reciprocity agreement, these examples show that the 
reciprocity agreement is still an active part of a state’s tax policy portfolio. 
More importantly, however, has been the advent of states joining the streamlined 
sales tax project (SSTP). The purpose of the SSTP is to help create a more uniform sales 
tax system among states which join the group. With our results indicating that states 
entering cooperative reciprocity agreements tend to engage in less income tax 
competition, it may be the case that the SSTP will serve a similar capacity by ushering 
in a new era of reduced competition over the state sales tax.  
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 Appendix Table A1 – Instruments for Spatial Lag Term 
(all pre-multiplied by weighting matrix W) 
 
 
VARIABLE 
 
MEAN 
(ST DEV) 
 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
SOURCE 
 
State per capita income 14.696 
 (9.040) 
 
Per capita personal income in thousands 
of current dollars 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
Election year dummy 0.269 
 (0.443) 
 
=1 if year t was an election year for the 
state, =0 otherwise 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
Same party Democrat 0.300 
 
(0.458) 
 
 
=1 if legislature and governor are 
controlled by Democrats in year t, =0 
otherwise 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
Same party Republican 0.162 
 
(0.368) 
 
 
=1 if legislature and governor are 
controlled by Republicans in year t, =0 
otherwise 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
Tax revenue share 
lagged 4 periods 
 
 
48.377 
(11.199) 
 
 
 
State's tax revenue as a share of total 
revenue lagged 4 periods in the past 
(share * 100) 
 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
Tax revenue share 
lagged 5 periods 
 
 
48.627 
(11.101) 
 
 
 
State's tax revenue as a share of total 
revenue lagged 5 periods in the past 
(share * 100) 
 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
General fund 
surplus/deficit lagged 4 
periods 
 
1.843 
(5.933) 
 
 
 
State's general fund surplus/deficit as a 
share of general fund revenue lagged 4 
periods 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
General fund 
surplus/deficit lagged 5 
periods 
 
1.765 
(5.969) 
 
 
 
State's general fund surplus/deficit as a 
share of general fund revenue lagged 5 
periods 
 
Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 
 
Notes:  Our sample includes 48 states over the period from 1967 to 2003, resulting in 1776 observations.  Alaska and Hawaii are 
excluded.  
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 Appendix Table A2 – Instruments for Income Tax Reciprocity Variables 
 
 
INSTRUMENT 
 
MEAN 
(ST DEV) 
 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
SOURCE 
Forest Fire Compact 
 
 
 
0.506 
(0.500) 
 
 
 
=1 if a state is part of any interstate  
compact (in year t) to provide forest fire  
protection to other member states; =0  
otherwise. 
 
Interstate Compacts & 
Agencies 2003, The Council 
of State Governments  
(p. 39-42) 
Fire History Compact 
 
 
 
 
14.908 
(17.515) 
 
 
 
= to the number of years a state has been 
part of any interstate compact to provide 
forest fire protection (in year t).   
 
Interstate Compacts & 
Agencies 2003, The Council 
of State Governments  
(p. 39-42) 
Adoption Compact 
 
 
 
 
0.082 
(0.275) 
 
 
 
=1 if a state is part of an adoption 
assistance compact (in year t) that 
provides for the protection of children in 
interstate adoption cases; =0 otherwise. 
 
Interstate Compacts & 
Agencies 2003, The Council 
of State Governments  
(p. 28) 
Special Needs Compact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.171 
(0.376) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=1 if a state is part of an adoption and 
medical assistance compact (in year t) 
that promises protections and medical 
assistance to special needs children 
involved in interstate adoptions; =0 
otherwise.   
 
 
Interstate Compacts & 
Agencies 2003, The Council 
of State Governments  
(p. 29-30) 
 
Notes:  Our sample includes 48 states over the period from 1967 to 2003, resulting in 1776 observations.  Alaska and Hawaii are 
excluded.  
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 Summary of Reviewer's Appendix 
 
 
Reviewer's Tables 1 & 2  
 
These results are identical to the estimates reported in the paper (Tables 3 and 4) 
except  that the standard errors are White's heteroskedastic-consistent errors instead of 
Kelejian and Prucha's (2007) HAC spatial errors. 
 
The results in Reviewer's Tables 1 & 2 confirm that the statistical significance of 
our reciprocity variables remains robust when using 'conventional' standard errors. 
While Anselin and Kelejian's (1997) LM test for residual spatial autocorrelation 
supports the use of the spatial HAC estimator, our results are not dependent upon this 
estimator. 
   
 
Reviewer's Tables 3 & 4 
 
Due to growing concern over weak instruments, Reviewer's Tables 3 & 4 show 
our results from estimating our models by limited information maximum likelihood 
(LIML) with Kelejian and Prucha's (2007) spatial HAC errors.  Recent work by Flores-
Lagunes (2007) indicates that LIML outperforms conventional instrumental variables 
estimators (in terms of point estimates and coverage rates) in the presence of weak 
instruments. 
 
The results in Reviewer's Tables 3 & 4 confirm that the statistical significance of 
our reciprocity variables using an estimator that is more robust to the problems caused 
by weak instruments.  
 
 
Reviewer's Table 5 
 
This table shows the results from our first-stage regressions of our two 
reciprocity variables Reciprocity Indicator and Reciprocity Agreements. 
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 Reviewer's Table 1 
The Effect of Reciprocity Agreements on State Income Tax Rate Competition 
 
(Estimation by two-stage least squares with White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors) 
(† denotes an endogenous variable) 
  
 Contiguity Weights Population-Contiguity Weights 
Constant 11.0014 *** 6.0242 ** 12.2627 *** 7.9936 *** 
 (3.6944)   (2.9715)   (3.4959)   (2.7265)   
Percentage 65 & older -0.2132 ** -0.0815   -0.2715 *** -0.2134 * 
 (0.0997)   (0.0956)   (0.0964)   (0.1140)   
Per capita income -0.1458 *** -0.0970 * -0.1659 *** -0.1197 ** 
 (0.0444)   (0.0517)   (0.0444)   (0.0488)   
Election dummy -0.0611   -0.0784   -0.0815   -0.0869   
 (0.1456)   (0.1399)   (0.1389)   (0.1337)   
Democrat dummy -0.3247 ** -0.2732 ** -0.3135 *** -0.2711 ** 
 (0.1348)   (0.1098)   (0.1209)   (0.1083)   
Republican dummy 0.4142 ** 0.3803 ** 0.3995 ** 0.2842 * 
 (0.2066)   (0.1705)   (0.1860)   (0.1586)   
Unemployment rate 0.2146 *** 0.2277 *** 0.1440 *** 0.1753 *** 
 (0.0432)   (0.0479)   (0.0422)   (0.0567)   
Per capita federal transfers 0.0842   -0.1058   -0.2784   -0.3732   
 (0.3576)   (0.3467)   (0.3733)   (0.3766)   
Per capita outstanding debt -0.0311   -0.1252   0.0095   -0.0622   
 (0.0494)   (0.0919)   (0.0474)   (0.0784)   
Reciprocity indicator (=1 if any agreement) † -6.6657 * -6.2822 **    
 (3.9420)   (2.5655)      
Reciprocity agreements (= # of agreements) †   -2.8192   -2.0149   
   (1.7400)   (1.3161)   
Neighbors tax rate† -0.7368 ** -0.4586 *** -0.6152 *** -0.3578 *** 
 (0.3071)   (0.1481)   (0.2196)   (0.0896)   
(Neighbors tax rate * Reciprocity indicator) † 1.1569   0.8873 **    
 (0.7211)   (0.4030)      
(Neighbors tax rate * Reciprocity agreements) †   0.5156 * 0.3897 ** 
   (0.2770)   (0.1846)   
 
Notes:  Estimation was by two-stage least squares with White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors reported in 
parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.  
Models were applied to 48 states (excludes Alaska and Hawaii) over the period 1967 – 2003 and include both state 
and year fixed effects that are not reported. 
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 Reviewer's Table 2 
The Effect of Reciprocity Agreements on State Cigarette Tax Rate Competition 
 
(Estimation by two-stage least squares with White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors) 
(† denotes an endogenous variable) 
  
 Contiguity Weights Population-Contiguity Weights 
Constant 24.0871 * 46.2532 ** 16.7176   14.0769   
 (14.2721)   (23.2740)   (18.2726)   (17.9362)   
Percentage 65 & older -2.5632 *** -2.7471 *** -1.9490 *** -1.0181   
 (0.5592)   (0.6705)   (0.6351)   (0.6803)   
Per capita income 1.2816 *** 1.0885 ** 1.5342 *** 1.5237 *** 
 (0.3636)   (0.4507)   (0.4495)   (0.3781)   
Election dummy -0.5514   -0.5256   -0.4971   -0.5374   
 (0.6201)   (0.7290)   (0.6854)   (0.6593)   
Democrat dummy 0.4795   0.2653   0.9538   0.9633   
 (0.6001)   (0.6747)   (0.6217)   (0.6971)   
Republican dummy 0.0794   0.2461   -0.2823   -0.3917   
 (0.8732)   (0.9945)   (0.9539)   (0.9979)   
Unemployment rate 0.2237   -0.6034   0.0793   -0.1392   
 (0.1962)   (0.5459)   (0.2290)   (0.3999)   
Per capita federal transfers -2.9745   -5.0243   -2.4892   -4.1591   
 (2.5607)   (3.0951)   (2.9476)   (3.1626)   
Per capita outstanding debt -0.3885   -0.1174   -0.4193   -0.5063   
 (0.3219)   (0.3719)   (0.3945)   (0.4658)   
Reciprocity indicator (=1 if any agreement) † 16.3641 **  32.1357 ***  
 (7.7352)    (10.5238)    
Reciprocity agreements (= # of agreements) †  10.2799 *   4.7794   
  (5.3407)     (3.8894)   
Neighbors tax rate† 0.8406 *** 0.8606 *** 0.7005 *** 0.6891 *** 
 (0.0980)   (0.1100)   (0.0858)   (0.0910)   
(Neighbors tax rate * Reciprocity indicator) † -0.1001    -0.6029 ***  
 (0.1620)    (0.1697)    
(Neighbors tax rate * Reciprocity agreements) †  -0.2192 *   -0.2055 *** 
  (0.1131)     (0.0679)   
 
Notes:  Estimation was by two-stage least squares with White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors reported in 
parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.  
Models were applied to 48 states (excludes Alaska and Hawaii) over the period 1967 – 2003 and include both state 
and year fixed effects that are not reported. 
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 Reviewer's Table 3 
The Effect of Reciprocity Agreements on State Income Tax Rate Competition 
 
(Estimation by limited information maximum likelihood with Kelejian and Prucha's (2007) HAC spatial standard 
errors) 
(† denotes an endogenous variable) 
  
 Contiguity Weights Population-Contiguity Weights 
Constant 15.5271 *** 13.5948 *** 6.2238   7.8552 * 
 (3.6171)   (3.6828)   (4.0693)   (4.6913)   
Percentage 65 & older -0.2817 ** -0.2855 ** -0.0795   -0.2076   
 (0.1103)   (0.1369)   (0.0865)   (0.1316)   
Per capita income -0.1677 *** -0.1728 ** -0.0943   -0.1150   
 (0.0391)   (0.0682)   (0.1086)   (0.1318)   
Election dummy -0.0412   -0.0825   -0.0775   -0.0875   
 (0.0663)   (0.0617)   (0.0775)   (0.0640)   
Democrat dummy -0.4561 *** -0.3451 *** -0.2866 ** -0.2733 *** 
 (0.0882)   (0.0949)   (0.1435)   (0.0749)   
Republican dummy 0.6075 *** 0.4519 *** 0.4075 *** 0.2867 *** 
 (0.1355)   (0.0330)   (0.1288)   (0.0846)   
Unemployment rate 0.2335 *** 0.1379 *** 0.2345 *** 0.1794 *** 
 (0.0157)   (0.0123)   (0.0044)   (0.0485)   
Per capita federal transfers 0.3038   -0.3339   -0.0811   -0.3978   
 (0.5956)   (0.5539)   (0.7166)   (0.5268)   
Per capita outstanding debt -0.0100   0.0176   -0.1321   -0.0672   
 (0.0393)   (0.0685)   (0.1221)   (0.1229)   
Reciprocity indicator (=1 if any agreement) † -12.1737 ***  -7.1788 **  
 (2.3264)    (3.3876)    
Reciprocity agreements (= # of agreements) †  -3.6971 ***   -2.2514   
  (0.6167)     (1.6512)   
Neighbors tax rate† -1.1536 *** -0.7119 *** -0.5023 ** -0.3635 *** 
 (0.1357)   (0.1784)   (0.2543)   (0.0837)   
(Neighbors tax rate * Reciprocity indicator) † 2.1838 ***  1.0263    
 (0.6467)    (0.7795)    
(Neighbors tax rate * Reciprocity agreements) †  0.6612 ***   0.4240 * 
  (0.1425)     (0.2222)   
 
Notes:  Estimation was by limited information maximum likelihood with Kelejian and Prucha's (2007) spatial HAC 
standard errors reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at 
the 10 percent level.  Models were applied to 48 states (excludes Alaska and Hawaii) over the period 1967 – 2003 
and include both state and year fixed effects that are not reported. 
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 Reviewer's Table 4 
The Effect of Reciprocity Agreements on State Cigarette Tax Rate Competition 
 
(Estimation by limited information maximum likelihood with Kelejian and Prucha's (2007) HAC spatial standard 
errors) 
(† denotes an endogenous variable) 
  
 Contiguity Weights Population-Contiguity Weights 
Constant 25.3452 *** 87.1287 *** 17.8675   54.7491 *** 
 (6.3151)   (11.8576)   (13.3372)   (18.1336)   
Percentage 65 & older -2.5997 *** -3.4180 *** -1.8943 *** -1.5289   
 (0.5593)   (0.5279)   (0.6131)   (1.0507)   
Per capita income 1.2520 *** 0.5707   1.5213 *** 0.9395 *** 
 (0.2762)   (0.4775)   (0.1495)   (0.2423)   
Election dummy -0.5409 ** -0.3734 * -0.4820 ** -0.3451   
 (0.2282)   (0.2199)   (0.2014)   (0.3113)   
Democrat dummy 0.4735 *** 0.0151   0.9732 *** 0.5008   
 (0.1691)   (0.7621)   (0.2650)   (0.8594)   
Republican dummy 0.0747   0.2180 * -0.2772   -0.0203   
 (0.4446)   (0.1204)   (0.3677)   (0.6499)   
Unemployment rate 0.2080   -1.7378 ** 0.0394   -1.3124 ** 
 (0.1968)   (0.8592)   (0.1918)   (0.6300)   
Per capita federal transfers -3.0211   -7.7640   -2.8773   -6.8153   
 (4.0710)   (5.3669)   (3.7017)   (6.0312)   
Per capita outstanding debt -0.4023 * 0.1635   -0.5095   -0.4410   
 (0.2314)   (0.3746)   (0.3572)   (0.8405)   
Reciprocity indicator (=1 if any agreement) † 17.8670    36.2831 **  
 (16.7292)    (15.6599)    
Reciprocity agreements (= # of agreements) †  21.9150 **   17.1198 ** 
  (10.7167)     (8.6603)   
Neighbors tax rate† 0.8479 *** 0.9211 *** 0.7153 *** 0.7915 *** 
 (0.0360)   (0.1602)   (0.0592)   (0.0563)   
(Neighbors tax rate * Reciprocity indicator) † -0.1137    -0.7106 ***  
 (0.2879)    (0.2003)    
(Neighbors tax rate * Reciprocity agreements) †  -0.4734 *   -0.4476 ** 
  (0.2427)     (0.1900)   
 
Notes:  Estimation was by limited information maximum likelihood with Kelejian and Prucha's (2007) spatial HAC 
standard errors reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at 
the 10 percent level.  Models were applied to 48 states (excludes Alaska and Hawaii) over the period 1967 – 2003 
and include both state and year fixed effects that are not reported. 
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 Reviewer's Table 5 
First-Stage Regressions for State Income Tax Reciprocity Variables 
  
 Reciprocity Indicator Reciprocity Agreements 
Constant -0.9529 *** -3.9573 *** 
 (0.1499)   (0.7150)   
Percentage 65 & older 0.0370 *** 0.2368 *** 
 (0.0068)   (0.0355)   
Per capita income 0.0157 *** 0.0427 *** 
 (0.0037)   (0.0154)   
Election dummy -0.0071   -0.0081   
 (0.0115)   (0.0467)   
Democrat dummy 0.0003   0.0719 * 
 (0.0092)   (0.0389)   
Republican dummy 0.0159   -0.0829   
 (0.0147)   (0.0662)   
Unemployment rate 0.0105 *** 0.0814 *** 
 (0.0033)   (0.0144)   
Per capita federal transfers -0.0110   -0.2541 ** 
 (0.0166)   (0.1046)   
Per capita outstanding debt -0.0088   -0.1095 * 
 (0.0053)   (0.0571)   
Forest fire compact -0.0432 * -0.2835 *** 
 (0.0254)   (0.1076)   
Fire History compact 0.0012 ** 0.0022   
 (0.0005)   (0.0022)   
Adoption compact -0.0316 ** -0.1068 * 
 (0.0160)   (0.0681)   
Special needs compact 0.0119   0.1246 ** 
 (0.0128)   (0.0532)   
F-test for joint significance of instruments 2.971** 3.644*** 
Adjusted R2 0.882 0.880 
 
Notes:  Estimation was by OLS with White's heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors reported in parentheses. *** 
denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.  Models were applied 
to 48 states (excludes Alaska and Hawaii) over the period 1967 – 2003 and include both state and year fixed effects 
that are not reported. 
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